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The modern era of Second Crusade studies began with a seminal article by Giles Constable 
entitled ‘The Second Crusade as seen by Contemporaries’ (1953). Constable focuses on the 
central role of Pope Eugenius III and his fellow Cistercian, Abbot Bernard of Clairvaux, in the 
genesis and expansion in scope of the Second Crusade. He pays particular attention to what 
has become known as the Syrian campaign. But his central thesis maintains that by the spring 
of 1147 and the issuing of the papal bull Divina dispensatione (II), Pope Eugenius III ‘viewed 
and planned’ the venture as a general Christian offensive against a number of the Church’s 
enemies. Thus, the siege of the Syrian Muslim city of Damascus in 1148 and the expeditions 
of the same year  directed against the Baltic  strongholds of Dobin,  Demmin and Szczecin 
situated in the pagan Slav lands east of the River Elbe formed part of what we now call the 
Second Crusade. The supposed scope of the venture was even greater than this: the Christian 
attacks on the Muslim-held Iberian cities and strongholds of Santarém, Lisbon, Cinta, Almada 
and Palmela in 1147, Faro, Almería and Tortosa in 1148, and Lérida and Fraga in 1149 also  
formed  part  of  the  same single  enterprise  to  secure  and expand the  peripheries  of  Latin 
Christendom.1
Constable’s work has proved very influential over the past two decades. The volume 
of  articles  entitled  The Second  Crusade  and  the  Cistercians (1992),  edited  by  Michael 
Gervers, addresses the impact of Cistercian monks on the crusade movement.  The Second 
Crusade: Scope and Consequences (2001), edited by Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch, is a 
volume of diverse articles which concentrate on the recruitment and consequences of some of 
the various  expeditions  identified  by Constable.  In 2007, Jonathan Phillips  published  The 
Second Crusade: Extending the Frontiers of Christendom. The first monograph on the Second 
Crusade published since Bernard Kugler’s  Studien zur Geschichte  des  Zweiten Kreuzzugs 
(1866), Phillips’s study combines a great deal of original research and insight, while being 
able to draw on the most recent advances in modern scholarship. Discussions on the genesis 
of  the  various  expeditions  and chapters  on  the  different  theatres  of  war  as  identified  by 
Constable provide the framework for Phillips’s study.2
1 Giles  Constable,  ‘The  Second  Crusade  as  Seen  by  Contemporaries’,  Traditio 9  (1953),  213–79; 
Eugenius III,  no.  3,  in  Pommersches  Urkundenbuch,  ed.  Klaus  Conrad  and  others,  2nd  edn,  9  vols  (Köln, 
1970–), 1: 36–37, reprinted in Hans-Dietrich Kahl, ‘Crusade Eschatology as Seen by St Bernard in the Years 
1146 to 1148’, in The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, ed. Michael Gervers (New York, 1992), pp. 35–48 
(here pp. 43–44).
2 The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, ed. Gervers;  The Second Crusade: Scope and Consequences, 
ed. Jonathan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester, 2001); Jonathan Phillips, The Second Crusade: Extending  
the  Frontiers  of  Christendom (New  Haven,  2007);  Bernard  Kugler,  Studien  zur  Geschichte  des  Zweiten  
Kreuzzugs (Stuttgart, 1866).
The recent accumulation of major works on the Second Crusade has thrown a great 
deal  of light  on the complex character  of this  remarkable  mid-twelfth-century endeavour. 
Nonetheless, the inclination to focus on the origins of the well-known expeditions and on the 
crusade in  the Levant  has  tended to obscure the impact  of the various  campaigns  on the 
societies they encountered and on the peripheral regions which might have been affected by 
preaching for the Second Crusade. This volume will readdress this relative neglect by placing 
established, contentious and new events and concepts associated with the enterprise in a wider 
ideological, chronological, geopolitical and geographical context. 
This introductory article serves a number of purposes. It offers an abridged narrative 
of the scope of the Second Crusade and introduces the major debates associated with the 
venture. All the contributions to the present volume are introduced within this framework and, 
when applicable, their place in the current historiography is highlighted. While serving as a 
concise introduction to the multifaceted nature of the crusade and, for the first time, drawing 
attention to the main debates associated with it within a single article, this approach will also 
underscore  the  editors’  reasoning  for  the  need  for  a  further  collection  of  articles  on  this 
extraordinary phenomenon.
The  very  scope  of  the  Second  Crusade  is  a  source  of  contention.  A  number  of 
contemporary  commentators  were  aware  of  a  causal  relationship  between  different 
campaigns. Helmold of Bosau, writing around 1170, famously recorded that the ‘initiators of 
the expedition’ formed a plan to instigate campaigns to the East, Iberia and against the pagan 
Slavs. Hindsight must explain this unique claim: Helmold evidently knew that the fighting on 
the  different  fronts  was  somehow linked  and assumed  that  the  conflict  formed  part  of  a 
conscious plan.3 Helmold was far from being alone in recognising a connection between the 
different theatres of war. The Annales Rodenses state that the expeditio was divided into three 
parts which went on to fight in Lisbon, against the pagan Slavs and in Syria.4 The  Annales  
Magdeburgenses, Annales Palidenses and  Annales Colonienses maximi  also give details of 
the Christian  attacks  on Lisbon,  the  Baltic  region and Damascus.5 The  Casus monasterii  
Petrihusensis linked the  proposed Syrian  campaign with  the decision  to  attack  the  pagan 
Slavs, known collectively to Western Christians as Wends, as did Otto of Freising.6 The De 
expugnatione Lyxbonensi and the ‘Lisbon Letter’, as well as the Annales Elmarenses and the 
Sigeberti  Continuatio Valcellensis suggest that  the attack on Lisbon had its  origins in the 
preaching  for  the  Syrian  campaign.7 The  Praemonstratensian  continuator  of  Sigebert  of 
Gembloux and Robert of Torigny mention the fighting in the Levant and at Lisbon, Almería 
and Tortosa.8 Henry of Huntingdon contrasted the Christian success in Lisbon with the failure 
3 Helmold  of  Bosau,  ‘Chronica  Slavorum’,  ed.  Heinz  Stoob,  Ausgewählte  Quellen  zur  deutschen  
Geschichte des Mittelalters, 19 (Darmstadt, 2008), I.65 (pp. 216–21).
4 ‘Annales Rodenses’, ed. Georg H. Pertz, in MGH SS, 16: 688–723 (here 718).
5 ‘Annales  Magdeburgenses’,  ed.  Georg  H.  Pertz,  in  MGH  SS,  16:  105–96 (here  188–89);  ‘Annales 
Palidenses’,  ed.  Georg H. Pertz, in MGH SS, 16: 48–98 (here 83); ‘Annales Colonienses maximi’,  ed. Karl 
Pertz, in MGH SS, 17: 729–847 (here 761–63).
6 ‘Casus Monasterii Petrishusensis’, ed. Otto Abel and Ludwig Weiland, in MGH SS, 20: 621–83 (here 
674);  Otto of Freising, Continued by Rahewin,  Gesta Frederici seu rectius Cronica, ed. Franz-Josef Schmale, 
trans.  Adolf Schmidt, 2nd edn (Darmstadt, 1974), I.43 (pp. 210–13) and  The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, 
trans. Charles Christopher Mierow (New York, 1953), p. 76.
7 The Conquest of Lisbon: De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. Charles Wendell David, with a new 
foreword and bibliography by Jonathan Phillips (New York, 2001), pp. 68–79; Susan B. Edgington, ‘The Lisbon 
Letter and the Second Crusade’, Historical Research 69 (1996), 328–39 (here 336–39); ‘Annales Elmarenses’, in 
Les annales de Saint-Pierre de Gand et de Saint-Amand, ed. P. Grierson (Bruxelles, 1937), p. 110; ‘Sigeberti 
Continuatio Valcellensis’, ed. Ludwig Konrad Bethmann, in MGH SS, 6: 458–60 (here 459–60).
of the Syrian expedition and mentioned the Almería campaign.9 A contemporary troubadour 
poem likewise made the connection between the fighting in the Levant and the Christian-
Muslim conflict in Iberia.10
Whilst Constable concludes that the near simultaneous attacks on the Wends and the 
Muslims of Iberia and Syria formed part of a general Christian offensive, Alan Forey argues 
that neither the writings of most of the contemporary chroniclers and annalists, nor those of 
Eugenius III and Bernard of Clairvaux prove that the crusade was conceived as a concerted 
Christian attack on three fronts. He adds that most of the sources show little recognition of the 
conflict in more than one theatre, and concludes that only the Syrian campaign was initially 
planned. Concerning the Christian assaults in the Baltic region and the attack on Almería by 
King Alfonso VII of León-Castile, ‘Eugenius appears in fact to have been doing no more than 
agree to the particular schemes which others had devised and to have considered them as 
meritorious’.  Forey’s  conclusions  imply  that  the  other  campaigns  identified  by Constable 
should not be considered as forming part of the Second Crusade.11
It is not surprising that most contemporary commentators were aware of the conflict 
on only one front. In an age of poor communications, contemporaries could only comment on 
events and circumstances that came to their immediate attention. Access to news was usually 
determined by contact with eyewitnesses or written reports, and this depended upon where 
and when the scribe was writing. Normally such accounts were narrow in scope, being the 
product of individuals with their own immediate and perhaps regional concerns and interests 
to relate. A writer would often record only what they considered worthy or significant, or 
perhaps what their particular audience might like to know. News of events taking place far 
from the writers’ geographical spheres of interest was unlikely to reach them and perhaps was 
even less likely to be recorded. We should expect most contemporary commentators on the 
enterprise  to  show awareness of only one theatre  of war.  And as we will  see below, the 
actions  of  Pope  Eugenius,  Abbot  Bernard  and  the  Church  authorities  in  supporting  and 
endorsing the near simultaneous campaigns in Iberia and against the pagan Slavs were indeed 
reactive. There is no evidence to suggest that pope and abbot initially conceived of a strategy 
embracing Christian assaults on three fronts. 
Nevertheless,  as  Phillips  observes  and  as  we have  just  seen,  commentators  easily 
accommodated  the  Iberian  and  Baltic  campaigns  within  the  context  of  the  contemporary 
expedition to the Levant.12 That most contemporaries were seemingly aware of the conflict in 
only one theatre does not mean that the preaching of holy war by Eugenius and Bernard had a 
negligible impact on that theatre. Nor does it preclude the possibility that such conflict should 
be  considered  as  forming  part  of  the  Second  Crusade.  These  are  simple  and  obvious 
observations, but they nonetheless provide part of the editors’ rationale for the compilation of 
the  present  volume.  Forey’s  and  indeed  Constable’s  frameworks  need  not  constrain  the 
scholar of Christian holy war in the mid-twelfth century. The historian can consider whether 
the phenomenal success of the Cistercian call to arms somehow influenced theatres of war 
that are not traditionally associated with the Second Crusade. Only then can one discern the 
8 ‘Sigeberti Continuatio Praemonstratensis’, ed. Ludwig Konrad Bethmann, in MGH SS, 6: 447–56 (here 
447, 453–54); Robert of Torigny, ‘Chronicon’, ed.  Ludwig Konrad Bethmann, in MGH SS, 6: 475–535 (here 
497–98).
9 Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Anglorum, ed. and trans. Diana Greenway (Oxford, 1996), pp. 752–53.
10 Pierre Bec, La Lyrique française au Moyen Age (XIIe–XIIIe s.), 2 vols (Paris, 1977–78), 2: 86.
11 Alan J. Forey, ‘The Second Crusade: Scope and Objectives’,  Durham University Journal 86 (1994), 
165–75 (here 172).
12 Phillips, Second Crusade, p. xxviii.
potential scope of the enterprise. An introduction to a volume that seeks in part to challenge 
the largely accepted scope of the Second Crusade must  necessarily address this  debate at 
points during its discourse and perhaps even contribute to the discussion.
On Christmas Eve 1144,  Zangī, the Muslim ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, seized the 
Christian-held  city  of  Edessa  in  Mesopotamia.  News of  the  fall  of  Edessa  and the  Latin 
settlers’  appeals for military help probably reached the West by the spring of 1145. Pope 
Eugenius III subsequently issued the papal bull  Quantum praedecessores on 1 December of 
that  year.  Sanctioned  by  God’s  representative  on  earth  and  specifying  the  temporal  and 
spiritual privileges for those who decided to take the cross,  Quantum praedecessores was 
initially  addressed  and first  dispatched to  the  court  of  King Louis VII  of  France  and his 
magnates. The bull marked the formal proclamation and legitimisation of a military campaign 
to defend the Latin Church in the Levant. However, it was the reissue of the bull (with a few 
small changes) on 1 March 1146 that brought about the formal launch of the expedition at 
King Louis’s Easter court at Vézelay, 1146.13 
The  time  lapse  between  Zangī’s  capture  of  Edessa  and  the  issuing  of  Quantum 
praedecessores, and the reasons why the Syrian expedition was not formally launched until 
after  the  bull  was  reissued,  have  been  sources  of  much  discussion.  John G.  Rowe,  who 
represents Eugenius III as a figure much more concerned with the papacy’s political problems 
than the fate of the Latin settlers in the East, suggests that the pope had probably heard of the 
fall of Edessa by March 1145. He argues that it took an Armenian delegation of churchmen 
and the arrival in the West in November 1145 of Hugh, bishop of Jabala, to turn the pope’s 
attention away from his Italian preoccupations. Before then the pope failed to consider the 
security of Outremer.14 Odo of Deuil, one of our two main sources on the origins of the Syrian 
expedition, portrays King Louis VII of France as the sole initiator of the campaign.15 Rowe 
suggests that when Louis first attempted to gather support for an expedition to the Levant at  
his Christmas court at Bourges in 1145, he probably knew nothing about the existence of 
Quantum praedecessores.16 Certainly, issued at Vetrella on 1 December 1145, it is unlikely 
that the bull reached Bourges, some 600 miles away, by Christmas of that year. On the other 
hand, Aryeh Graboïs’s and George Ferzoco’s reading of Otto of Freising, the second of our 
two sources, suggests that the pope actually issued the bull in response to the king’s initiative 
that was first made public at Bourges.17 There was indeed contact between the French crown 
and the curia during the summer and autumn of 1145.18 It would appear that the bull was not 
issued  independently  of  Louis’s  wishes,  but  in  fact  reflected  a  realisation  of  his  aims. 
Historians have offered a number of reasons why Louis took the cross. Graboïs argues that 
13 Odo of Deuil,  De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem. The Journey of Louis VII to the East, ed. and 
trans. Virginia Gingerick Berry (New York, 1948), pp. 8–9; Letter of 1 December 1145: Eugenius III, ‘Epistolae 
et privilegia’, in PL, 180: 1013–1614 (here 1064–66). Letter of 1 March 1146: R. Grosse, ‘Überlegungen zum 
Kreuzzugsaufruf Eugens III. von 1145/46. Mit einer Neuedition von JL 8876’, Francia 18 (1991), 85–92. There 
is a translation based on this document in Phillips, Second Crusade, pp. 280-82.
14 See John G. Rowe, ‘The Origins of the Second Crusade: Pope Eugenius III, Bernard of Clairvaux and 
Louis VII of France’, in The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, ed. Gervers, pp. 80–89 (here pp. 81–84).
15 Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem, p. 6.
16 Rowe, ‘The Origins of the Second Crusade’, p. 83.
17 Aryeh  Graboïs,  ‘The Crusade  of  King  Louis VII:  A Reconsideration’,  in  Crusade and Settlement:  
Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East Presented to  
R. C. Smail,  ed.  Peter  W. Edbury (Cardiff,  1985),  pp. 94–104; George  Ferzoco,  ‘The Origin of the Second 
Crusade’, in The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, ed. Gervers, pp. 91–99 (here pp. 92–93); Otto of Freising, 
Gesta Frederici, I.36 (pp. 200–1) and The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 70–71.
18 Phillips, Second Crusade, pp. 41–42.
Bernard  of  Clairvaux  probably  convinced  Louis  to  undertake  a  penitential  pilgrimage  to 
Jerusalem to expiate his sin for the king’s opposition to the election of Peter of La Châtre to 
the archbishopric of Bourges in 1141. Louis was placed under interdict for his opposition to 
Peter until 1144. Graboïs highlights Louis’s displays of piety and his apparent lack of interest 
in worldly matters while en route to the Latin East. He argues that Louis’s determination to 
visit the holy places – and particularly Jerusalem – is a reflexion of the king as a penitential 
pilgrim, not as an armed warrior who marched east to bring military help to the Latin settlers:  
‘The crusade of King Louis VII was thus a pilgrimage to Jerusalem’.19 Marcus Bull counters 
this  argument,  suggesting  that  prior  to  embarking  for  the  East,  Louis  was  determined  to 
identify himself with crusading through symbolically charged forms of ritualistic display and 
association  with  both  Eugenius III  and  Bernard  of  Clairvaux.  Moreover,  far  from  being 
detached from secular matters, Louis took the opportunity to express his royal authority while 
on crusade.20 Louis surely wanted to be recognised as both a king and a holy warrior. The 
development of such a royal persona was central to Capetian ‘propaganda’ that increasingly 
sought  to  associate  the  burgeoning crusading movement  with  the  legitimacy of  the  royal 
dynasty. Phillips adds that Louis seems to have been genuinely affected by the loss of Edessa. 
He also points out that at Bourges the king demanded that his men follow him to aid their 
brothers in the East. The pilgrimage to Jerusalem was not at the forefront of his mind.21 
According to  Ferzoco,  Louis’s  initial  attempt  to  launch the  expedition  at  Bourges 
failed  for  unspecified  ‘political  reasons’.22 Phillips  adds  that  the  magnates  at  Louis’s 
Christmas court chose to delay their verdict on whether to campaign in the East owing to a 
mixture of secular and spiritual concerns. He stresses, however, that the absence at Bourges of 
Quantum praedecessores was probably the deciding factor that compelled Louis’s associates 
to postpone their decision until the Easter meeting at Vézelay.23 Rowe suggests that the initial 
bull probably reached both Louis and Bernard of Clairvaux – whom was to be commissioned 
with preaching the Syrian campaign – around the middle of January 1146. Both sent replies to 
Eugenius  whom  then  incorporated  their  ideas  into  his  March  reissue  of  Quantum 
praedecessores.24
Recent opinion on Eugenius, combined with (and perhaps influenced by) Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s rather disparaging comments concerning the pontiff, tends to give the impression 
that Eugenius cared little for the fate of the Latin East or at best adopted a rather passive 
attitude  towards  the  region.25 That  he  spent  little  time  preaching  the  Syrian  campaign  in 
person cannot have helped his reputation. The bulk of the recruitment drive was left to Abbot 
Bernard of Clairvaux and his trusted Cistercian colleagues.
Eugenius’s commission to his fellow Cistercian was in fact an astute choice: Bernard 
was and still is widely recognised as being the most influential spiritual leader of his time. In 
the  words  of  Otto  of  Freising,  he  was  ‘endowed with  wisdom and knowledge of  letters, 
renowned for signs and miracles’. He was perceived ‘as a divine oracle’ and was therefore the 
19 Graboïs, ‘The Crusade of King Louis VII’, pp. 91–99.
20 Marcus Bull, ‘The Capetian Monarchy and the Early Crusade Movement: Hugh of Vermandois and 
Louis VII’, Nottingham Medieval Studies 40 (1996), 25–45.
21 Phillips, Second Crusade, p. 64.
22 Ferzoco, ‘The Origin of the Second Crusade’, p. 94.
23 Phillips, Second Crusade, pp. 61–63.
24 Rowe, ‘The Origins of the Second Crusade’, p. 84.
25 See, for example, Christopher J. Tyerman,  God’s War: A New History of the Crusades (Cambridge, 
Mass., 2006), p. 275; Bernard of Clairvaux, ‘Epistolae’, in Sancti Bernardi Opera, ed. Jean Leclercq and Henri 
Rochais, 8 vols (Roma, 1957–77), 8: 113–15 (no. 237); for the translation see  The Letters of St. Bernard of  
Clairvaux, trans. Bruno Scott James, 2nd edn (Stroud, 1998), pp. 385–86 (no. 315).
perfect recruiting agent for the Syrian expedition.26 The pope pointed out that he himself was 
unable to preach the campaign in person because of his political problems with the Roman 
citizens.27 However, he sent missives to England, the town of Tournai and to Count Thierry of 
Flanders, and it is likely that Quantum praedecessores formed part of this communication.28 
He appointed  a  plethora  of  papal  legates  with  the undoubted  hope of  providing the holy 
warriors with both temporal and spiritual support.29 In addition, he attempted to facilitate the 
progress of the Syrian expedition by communicating with the kings of Sicily and Hungary, 
and the Byzantine emperor.30 These are not exactly the passive acts of an uncaring pontiff. 
Phillips has worked hard to rehabilitate Eugenius’s reputation, and most significantly, 
he has demonstrated that Eugenius and the curia must have been very anxious about the fate 
of  the  Latin  East  during  the  latter  half  of  1145.  In the decades  following the  capture  of 
Jerusalem  in  1099,  chroniclers  continued  to  emphasise  the  divine  approval  of  the  First 
Crusade, the bravery and honour of the First Crusaders and the special spiritual significance 
of  the  Holy  City.  Through  a  lengthy  exposition  of  Quantum  praedecessores, Phillips 
highlights a number of themes that are repeated throughout the bull and that exploited the 
remarkable legacy of the First Crusade: the precedent of Pope Urban II and the First Crusade; 
the idea of sons imitating and augmenting the heroic deeds of their forbears; the offer of the 
remission of sins; the need to help the Eastern Church; the idea that Eugenius acted with 
divine authority;  and an appeal to his audience’s sense of knightly honour. Each of these 
themes was chosen carefully in order to resonate with his warrior audience. The response to 
the preaching of the Syrian campaign was remarkable. Given that  Quantum praedecessores 
should have accompanied every official crusade sermon, it was evidently a well-researched 
and  expertly  crafted  piece  for  which  ‘Eugenius  himself,  along  with  his  cardinals  and 
colleagues’ must take credit.31 Rudolf Hiestand adds that Eugenius stayed north of the Alps 
between March 1147 and May 1148, and argues that once the pope had launched the Syrian 
campaign he saw it  as his duty to contribute to the stability and order in the French and 
imperial realms.32
At King Louis’s Easter court at Vézelay, 1146, Bernard of Clairvaux give his famous 
crusade sermon and the king, his wife Eleanor of Aquitaine and at least twenty-four other 
great magnates as well as many of the watching crowd took the cross.33 Bernard then issued a 
standard  letter,  tailored  to  meet  individual  circumstances,  and intended  to  be read  out  in 
conjunction with  Quantum praedecessores by either designated preachers or local clergy.34 
26 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, I.36 (pp. 200–1) and The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 70–71.
27 Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem, pp. 8–9.
28 ‘Hisoriae Tornacenses partim ex Herimanni libris excerptae’, ed. Georg Waitz, in MGH SS, 14: 327–52 
(here 345); ‘Historia gloriosi regis Ludovici VII, filii Ludovici grossi’, in Recueil des Historiens des Gaules et  
de la France, ed. Martin Bouquet and others, 24 vols (Paris, 1738–1904), 12: 124–33 (here 126); Eugenius to the 
bishop of Salisbury, in  Regesta pontificum Romanorum, ed. Philip Jaffé and others, 2nd edn, 2 vols (Leipzig,  
1885–88), 2: 36 (no. 8959).
29 Constable, ‘The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries’, pp. 263–65.
30 Rudolf Hiestand, ‘The Papacy and the Second Crusade’, in  Second Crusade, ed.  Phillips and Hoch, 
pp. 32–53 (here p. 44).
31 Phillips, Second Crusade, pp. 17–60. Quotation at p. 50. 
32 Hiestand, ‘The Papacy and the Second Crusade’, pp. 40–43.
33 ‘Historia gloriosi regis Ludovici VII’, pp. 125–27.
34 On Bernard’s crusading letters see: Peter Rassow, ‘Die Kanzlei St. Bernhards von Clairvaux’, Studien 
und Mitteilungen zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens 34 (1913), 243–79; Jean Leclercq, ‘L’encyclique de 
saint Bernard en faveur de la croisade’,  Revue bénédictine 81 (1971), 282–308; Etienne Delaruelle, ‘L’idée de 
croisade chez saint Bernard’, in Mélanges saint Bernard: XXIVe Congrès de l’Association bourguignonne des  
The abbot’s extant correspondence preaching the campaign to the Levant is addressed to the 
archbishops of ‘Eastern Francia’ (the central Rhineland) and Bavaria, Arnold, archbishop of 
Cologne, Manfredo, bishop of Brescia, the Knights Hospitaller and the duke, magnates and 
people of Bohemia.35 Bernard’s secretary,  Nicholas of Clairvaux,  also addressed a similar 
letter  to the count and nobles of Brittany in which he announced the forthcoming visit of 
Geoffrey of Lèves, bishop of Chartres, to preach for the expedition.36 Bernard also instructed 
Abbot Reynald of Morimond to preach at Bassingy and there is some evidence to suggest that 
Gerlach, abbot of Rein, was asked to preach in Carinthia and Styria.37 
The  message  of  Eugenius  and  Bernard  and  the  supposed  propagation  of  a  new, 
transcendental  concept  of  the  crusade  indulgence  providing  absolution  from  divine 
punishments  for  sin,  independent  from ecclesiastically  imposed  penance,  have  long  been 
discussed. Constable, Ersnt-Dieter Hehl and Hans Eberhard Mayer are amongst those who 
argue that Eugenius’s offer of the remission of sins marked a significant advance in crusade 
theology. They state that Pope Urban II only promised the First Crusaders the remission of the 
specific penitential punishments enjoined by the Church. Eugenius is thought to have also 
offered absolution from temporal (that is, divine) punishments for sin inflicted by God in this 
world  and  the  next.  Mayer  follows  Jonathan  Riley-Smith  in  suggesting  that  Eugenius’s 
formulation reflected the popular reinterpretation of Urban’s original promise. After Urban’s 
sermon  at  Clermont  in  1095,  preachers  and  would-be  crusaders  blurred  any  distinction 
between the remission of penance and the remission of sins.38
In  her  contribution  to  the  present  volume,  Ane  Bysted  points  out  that  the  actual 
theology of penance as propagated by the clerical elite in the mid-twelfth century, and the 
relation  between the act  of  penance and the remission and forgiveness  of sins,  is  in  fact 
unclear. Therefore, current suggestions that Eugenius’s offer of the remission of sins marked a 
significant advance in crusading theology remain hypotheses until further work is completed 
on the theology of penance in the late eleventh and mid-twelfth centuries. Bysted suggests 
that  the  most  influential  development  in  crusade  theology  at  this  time  was  Bernard  of 
Clairvaux’s preaching of the campaign as a time of jubilee. This notion seemingly solved one 
of the more disturbing ambiguities in contemporary theology by stressing God’s mercy as the 
motivating force to take up arms. Bernard’s letters therefore circumvented the popular but 
Sociétés savantes (8e Centenaire de la mort de saint Bernard), Dijon, 1953 (Dijon, 1954), pp. 53–67.
35 Bernard of Clairvaux, ‘Epistolae’, pp. 311–17 (no. 363) and  The Letters of St. Bernard of Clairvaux, 
pp. 460–63 (no. 391); J. Groven, ‘Die Kölnfahrt Bernhards von Clairvaux’,  Annalen des Historischen Vereins  
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theologically unsound notion that campaigning against the enemies of Christ could be an act 
of self-salvation. William Purkis suggests that the Cistercians developed crusading theology 
in  one  further  area.  Neither  Eugenius  nor  Bernard  attempted  to  inculcate  the  Second 
Crusaders with the ideas of Christomimesis that were central to Pope Urban II’s preaching for 
the First  Crusade.  According to Purkis,  Bernard believed that  only those individuals  who 
devoted their whole life to the religious profession could truly pursue imitatio Christi; hence, 
the Cistercians’ call to would-be crusaders to imitate instead the heroic deeds of their forbears 
in the Holy Land.39
In  the  summer  of  1146,  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  began  his  legendary  seven-month 
preaching tour of the Low Countries and parts of the Holy Roman empire.40 In the meantime, 
during the month of October, Pope Eugenius III issued a second bull,  Divina dispensatione 
(I), to the people and churchmen of the imperial lands in northern Italy. Although lacking the 
narrative  details  of  Quantum  praedecessores,  the  bull  likewise  set  out  the  spiritual  and 
temporal privileges for following Louis VII’s example and embarking on such a holy labour.41 
The abbot eventually met with the emperor-elect, King Conrad III of Germany, around mid-
November at the king’s court in Frankfurt am Main. Conrad did not take the cross at this 
point,  but  when again  in the presence  of Bernard of  Clairvaux at  the Christmas  court  in 
Speyer,  the  king  and  his  nephew,  Frederick  of  Swabia,  as  well  many  other  princes  and 
illustrious men did indeed take the cross.42 
The origins and impetus behind Conrad’s recruitment for the campaign to the Levant 
are a matter of some debate.  The traditional  view, first posited by Harald Cosack, is that 
Bernard  of  Clairvaux  essentially  badgered  an  unwilling  Conrad  into  joining  the  Syrian 
expedition.43 Convention has it that the king was averse to taking the cross at his Frankfurt am 
Main court in November, and that his reluctance continued at Speyer until he was overcome 
by  an  electrifying  Bernardine  sermon.  Moreover,  Bernard’s  recruitment  of  Conrad  was 
unauthorised. Pope Eugenius disapproved of the emperor-elect’s involvement in the campaign 
as he had hoped that  Conrad would provide him with protection from the radical  Roman 
commune and King Roger II of Sicily. The grounds for this argument are found in a letter 
from Conrad to Eugenius datable  to March 1147 that  refers to a lost  letter  of the pope.44 
Crucially, Conrad writes that he took the cross ‘without your [Eugenius’s] knowledge’, which 
led  Graham  Loud  to  conclude  that  the  curia had  not  planned  on  Conrad  joining  the 
expedition.45 
In his  article  ‘Papacy,  Empire,  and the Second Crusade’ (2001), Phillips interprets 
Conrad’s letter differently: he reads it as an apology to Eugenius for the king’s failure to delay 
his preparations for embarking on campaign as the pope seemed to have advised. He also 
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argues that pertinent details in Conrad’s letter are ambiguous; it is very positive in tone; and 
there is no mention of Eugenius’s fear of Roger II or the Roman commune. He points out that 
Eugenius’s  predecessor,  Lucius II,  had  signed  a  seven-year  truce  with  Roger II  and  – 
admittedly with the benefit of hindsight – we know that peace was maintained between the 
pontiff and Roger.46 In his recent monograph on the Second Crusade, Phillips argues that 
Conrad was simply stating a fact when he wrote to Eugenius asserting that he had taken the 
cross without the pope’s knowledge. He adds that Eugenius could not have been surprised at 
this news, given that Bernard had been preaching in the empire since the previous October.47 
Perhaps it is worth highlighting that Bernard was unlikely to recruit the emperor-elect without 
papal authority: the abbot was well known for his obedience and observance of the right order 
of things. In any case, Bernard had a papal mandate to preach the holy enterprise. 
In a letter written while on campaign, the king actually states that he had set out after 
receiving advice and encouragement from both Bernard and Eugenius.48 The only surviving 
papal letter on the subject of Conrad’s participation in the Syrian expedition is positive. The 
appearance of five papal legates in the German imperial lands during 1147 is a reflection of 
the  pontiff’s  commitment  to  Conrad’s  campaign.  The  Cistercians  conceived  of  the 
relationship between the papacy and empire as that of the ecclesiastical and secular swords 
working in partnership to advance the cause of Christianity.49 When combined with Conrad’s 
experience,  influence  and  relations  as  ruler-elect  of  the  Holy  Roman  empire,  such  a 
conception may have predisposed the papacy to involve Conrad and the powerful and wealthy 
German nobility in the holy enterprise. The emperor-elect’s recruitment was indeed logical: 
Phillips points out that there was a German tradition of pilgrimage, holy war and crusading, 
and  that  Conrad  had  already  demonstrated  his  commitment  to  the  Holy  Land  when  he 
travelled to Jerusalem in 1124. Given that many nobles from the empire would respond to 
Eugenius’s and Bernard’s offer of the remission of sins, who better to lead them on campaign 
than Conrad III?50
That  Conrad  did  not  commit  himself  to  the  expedition  at  Frankfurt  am  Main  in 
November 1146 is explicable. The empire was in a state of political disorder. The king had to 
consider the potential political problems that might arise in his absence while on campaign 
and to plan contingencies should he fail to return. No major monarch had yet been on crusade 
and the risks at home and abroad were immense. As Phillips suggests, an announcement of 
Conrad’s commitment to the crusade at Speyer in December would have given Conrad and 
Bernard more time to resolve existing and potential political problems. The Christmas court 
would also have been a  well-attended,  appropriate  occasion for  officially  launching royal 
involvement in the expedition.51 Christopher Tyerman takes this further by suggesting that 
Bernard’s presence at both Frankfurt am Main and Speyer formed part of a well-orchestrated 
piece of recruiting theatre. He adds that it is inconceivable that the combined German force 
would have been ready to leave for the East in May 1147 unless Conrad’s position as nominal 
head of the army was known and accepted long before the king’s courts. Tyerman does not 
explain what was to be gained by turning down Bernard’s offer of the cross at Frankfurt am 
Main. But at Speyer, ‘Conrad fulfilled the ceremonial fiction of sudden conversation’ when he 
46 Jonathan Phillips, ‘Papacy, Empire and the Second Crusade’, in Second Crusade, ed. Phillips and Hoch, 
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49 Ian S. Robinson, The Papacy, 1073–1198. Continuity and Innovation (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 455–58.
50 Phillips, Second Crusade, pp. 88–93.
51 Phillips, Second Crusade, pp. 93–94.
received the cross and a holy banner from the hands of the abbot which had been placed 
conveniently nearby. Tyerman suggests that participation in the campaign would have been 
viewed as a practical demonstration of the reach of German imperial power.52 
By the end of the Regensburg diet in February 1147, where Abbot Adam of Ebrach 
read aloud the letters of Eugenius and Bernard, many members of the empire’s secular and 
ecclesiastical  nobility,  including  bishops  Henry  of  Regensburg,  Otto  of  Freising  and 
Reginbert of Passau, as well as Vladislav, duke of Bohemia, Ottokar, margrave of Styria and 
Welf VI,  younger  brother  of  the  dispossessed  former  duke  of  Bavaria,  Henry X,  had  all 
assumed the cross.53
Gathering at Regensburg in late May 1147, the forces headed by Conrad III either 
walked beside or navigated along the Danube before passing through Hungary and then the 
Byzantine empire. It is traditionally held that an exceptionally undisciplined German army 
posed  a  significant  threat  to  the  security  of  the  empire’s  capital,  Constantinople,  and 
consequently  Conrad’s  relations  with  the  Byzantine  emperor,  Manuel I  Komnenos,  were 
severely  strained.  These  conventional  notions  stem from the  works  of  Kugler,  Ferdinand 
Chalandon and Steven Runciman and they remain  highly influential.  Jonathan Harris,  for 
example, has argued recently that the Germans posed a real threat to the empire and that the 
behaviour of the German army caused Manuel Komnenos to treat Conrad and the German 
forces with enmity.54 Jason T. Roche’s contribution to the present volume analyses the Greek 
sources relating to the passage of the German army through the empire. His work sheds light 
on the  neglected  influence  of  the  contemporary  Greek encomiastic  tradition  on  the  well-
known  Greek  narratives  of  the  Second  Crusade.  Roche  advises  extreme  caution  before 
following convention and accepting the source portrayals of excessive German indiscipline 
and belligerence in the empire and of poor relations between the Staufer and the Komnenoi.
Conrad’s experiences in Anatolia and the reasons for the failure of the campaign in 
Asia Minor have also received attention recently. Conor Kostick, for example, restating the 
position  of  Kugler  and others  who have followed him,  believes  that  Conrad’s  army was 
unusually undisciplined and poorly organised. The army was thus in effect the agent of its 
own downfall  in  its  encounters  with  the  Anatolian  Turks.55 The  idea  that  indiscipline  or 
‘social unrest’ was somehow responsible for the failure of the crusade in Anatolia remains 
unproven. Loud wonders whether the armies of the Second Crusade were any more disorderly 
or poorly led than those of other medieval expeditions.56 Roche has recently demonstrated that 
the retinues accompanying Conrad were not extraordinarily undisciplined. Nor did the leading 
contingents  display unusual  levels  of disorganisation  and indiscipline  during their  clashes 
with the Turks.  The warriors did not  have the tactical  expertise  to  defeat  or even defend 
themselves against an enemy who employed tactics with which the Christians were largely 
unfamiliar.57 
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A number of contemporary sources suggest that Byzantine perfidy, in particular, that 
of Manuel Komnenos, was to blame for the collapse of the campaigns of both Conrad III and 
King Louis VII of France in  Anatolia.58 Chalandon was the first  to  consider  that  perhaps 
Manuel could be excused for causing the failure of the expeditions, as a successful campaign 
in the Levant would have challenged his imperial dignity and Byzantine interests in northern 
Syria.59 Runciman went further than Chalandon in stating that  Manuel may have actually 
condoned Turkish attacks  on the Christian  warriors  in  order  to maintain  a  truce with the 
Seljuks  of  Anatolia,  arguing  that  such a  truce  was  important  to  Manuel’s  foreign  policy 
towards  the  Latin  principality  of  Antioch.60 Ralph-Johannes  Lilie  follows  a  similar  line, 
suggesting  that  Manuel’s  supposed  attitude  towards  the  crusaders  is  indeed  explicable  in 
terms of imperial policy. He refrains from explicitly stating that Manuel encouraged Turkish 
attacks on the Christian warriors, but the accusation is certainly implied with regard to the 
assaults  on  the  French army.61 This  theory  has  since  hardened into  a  complete  negative. 
Phillips maintains that Manuel Komnenos did indeed incite the Turks to attack the French 
warriors, and Harris believes that he encouraged them to attack both the French and German 
armies.62 Such allegations are found in the contemporaneous Latin sources, although it is the 
charge  of  Byzantine  duplicity  offered  by  the  Greek  historian,  Niketas  Choniates,  that 
historians  cite  as  the  most  compelling  evidence.63 Roche  has  demonstrated  the  utter 
unreliability of Choniates as a source for the Second Crusade in Anatolia.  Concerning the 
German  expedition,  he  also  suggests  that  Latin  accusations  of  Byzantine  perfidy  are  a 
reflection of the crusaders’ ignorance of the topography of Anatolia and its fragile geopolitical 
situation. There was actually very little that the Byzantine emperor could have done to alter 
the fate of the German force once it had crossed the Bosphoros.64 
Amadeus III,  count  of  Maurienne,  led  a  crusader  force  through  Italy  en  route  to 
Constantinople. After crossing from Brindisi to Dyrrachion, he joined up with the army of 
King Louis VII of France at the Byzantine capital late in 1147. Louis’s army had advanced 
through France and Germany to Regensburg. It then followed Conrad along the Danube and 
into Hungary, before crossing into the western part of the Byzantine empire. After suffering 
losses  through  starvation  and  Turkish  attacks  in  Anatolia,  the  remnants  of  the  forces  of 
Louis VII and Amadeus III travelled by ship to the Levant and arrived at Antioch in March 
1148. 
The  prince  of  Antioch,  Raymond  of  Poitiers,  had  courted  the  French  king  in 
anticipation of his help in strengthening the prince’s power in northern Syria. Raymond hoped 
to subjugate a number of neighbouring cities including Aleppo, the centre of Zangīd power. 
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After  spending  three  months  recuperating  in  the  region,  Louis VII  declined  the  prince’s 
proposals  and instead  headed south  toward the kingdom of  Jerusalem.  The alleged affair 
between Raymond and his niece, the king’s wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, is often cited as a 
reason for Louis’s refusal to help Antioch. Contemporary rumours certainly suggested there 
was an incestuous liaison between Eleanor  and Raymond;  such rumours  could only have 
disinclined  Louis  to  help  the  prince.65 Graboïs  argues  that  the  king  had  little  interest  in 
campaigning in northern Syria  or indeed in recovering  Edessa,  since his  priority was the 
accomplishment of his pilgrimage to Jerusalem.66 Mayer points out that the native Christian 
population of Edessa was slaughtered, enslaved or exiled following the failed uprising which 
attempted to recover the city in October 1146.67 Martin Hoch adds that the city was pillaged 
and razed.68 There was thus little point in recovering Edessa, the loss of which was the initial 
casus belli. By extension, Louis may have felt there was less need to attack Aleppo as an 
indirect means of regaining Edessa. Phillips points out that the prince of Antioch was a vassal 
of Manuel I Komnenos and that the French crusaders blamed the emperor for their various 
problems in the Byzantine empire and Anatolia. In theory, any extension of Antiochene power 
was in effect an extension of Byzantine influence in the Levant, and this was something that  
the king and his advisors would not countenance.69 
The wishes and concerns of King Conrad III of Germany and the Jerusalemite nobility 
must  also  be  taken  into  consideration  when  discussing  Louis’s  decision  to  march  south. 
Having recuperated at the Byzantine court from his ordeals in Anatolia, Conrad arrived by 
ship at Acre in April 1148. Louis of course was still in the north at this point recovering from 
his  own  troubles  in  the  peninsula.  Otto  of  Freising  indicates  that  the  German  king 
subsequently made an agreement with King Baldwin III of Jerusalem, Patriarch Fulcher of 
Jerusalem and the Templars  to lead an army against  Damascus in the following July.70 It 
would appear that Conrad was made aware of the hopeless situation in Edessa and had been 
convinced that an attack on Damascus was in the best interests of the settlers in Outremer. 
William of Tyre confirms that the Jerusalemite nobility hoped the crusaders would offer them 
military assistance in taking a neighbouring Muslim city. He adds that Patriarch Fulcher was 
sent to Louis, who was at that time residing in Tripoli, to convince the king to continue south 
to Jerusalem.71 Perhaps it is not surprising that Louis chose to march south with his weakened 
army and looked to join forces with Conrad and the Jerusalemite barons, given that they had 
already agreed to attack Damascus. Surely Louis must have also considered that assisting the 
kingdom of Jerusalem (while taking the opportunity of visiting its holy places) would be of 
most  benefit  to  Latin  Christendom,  especially  given  his  likely  concerns  with  fighting  in 
northern Syria. 
Loud suggests that the great assembly of crusaders and Latin settlers that convened in 
the town of Palmarea near Acre on 24 June 1148 gathered merely to confirm the decision to 
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Crusade, p. 319, n. 18.
66 Graboïs, ‘The Crusade of King Louis VII’, p. 99.
67 Mayer, The Crusades, p. 105.
68 Martin Hoch, ‘The Choice of Damascus as the Objective of the Second Crusade: A Re-evaluation’, in 
Autour de la Premiére Croisade: Actes du Colloque de la Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin  
East, Clermont-Ferrand, 22–25 juin 1995, ed. Michel Balard (Paris, 1996), pp. 359–69 (here pp. 362–63).
69 Jonathan Phillips, Defenders of the Holy Land: Relations between the Latin East and the West, 1119–
1187, (Oxford, 1996), pp. 95–96.
70 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, I.64 (pp. 264–65) and The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 102–
03.
71 William of Tyre, Chronique, ed. R. B. C. Huygens (Turnhout, 1986), pp. 756–57. 
attack Damascus.72 Phillips posits that there may have been a need to give King Louis VII the 
opportunity  to  register  his  opinion  in  a  formal  settlement.73 Hoch  points  out  that  for  the 
Jerusalemite nobility, informal agreements such as the one seemingly made earlier to attack 
Damascus,  had  to  be  formally  agreed  before  a  campaign  could  be  launched  on  foreign 
territory.74 The decision to attack Damascus has also received scholarly attention. Following 
Runciman, Mayer argues that the plan to attack the city was ill conceived: its subsequent 
failure made an enemy of a city that had been allied with Jerusalem since 1140. Hoch has 
since  offered  a  number  of  reasons  why Damascus  was chosen as  a  target.  Perhaps  most 
contentiously, he argues that there had been a complete realignment in Muslim power in Syria 
in the years immediately preceding the council at Palmarea, the chief and pertinent product of 
which  was an alliance  between Damascus  and Aleppo made in  the  spring of  1147.  This 
agreement is said to have essentially rendered obsolete the former alliance between Damascus 
and the kingdom of Jerusalem. And in any case, that alliance was made in a specific strategic 
situation in 1140, and should not be viewed as an unconditional long-term agreement. If Hoch 
is correct, the Damascene-Aleppan alliance posed a significant threat to the security of the 
kingdom at the time of the council at Palmarea. The allied force of crusaders and Palestinian 
barons  therefore  decided to  attack  Damascus.75 The  unsuccessful  siege  of  Damascus  was 
lifted  within  days  and  its  failure  has  received  a  great  deal  of  attention.  The  older 
historiography tends to follow the original sources closely,  ascribing a seemingly doomed 
decision to move camp outside the Damascene walls to the self-seeking desires of various 
groups  and individuals.  More  recently,  historians  have  argued that  the  subsequent  retreat 
occurred owing to tactical failings. Forey and Phillips, for example, suggest that the allies 
gambled on storming the city but met with stiffer resistance than was expected. Lacking the 
supplies and the machines to conduct a longer siege, and perhaps most importantly,  faced 
with the imminent  threat  of confronting a Muslim relief  army,  the decision was made to 
change the point of attack to a supposedly weaker section of the city’s walls. The allies were 
compelled to retreat when once again the city walls looked as if they would withstand a brief 
siege.76 
In her contribution to the present volume, Deborah Gerish points out there is no extant 
eyewitness record of the lead up to and occurrence of these events produced by a European 
immigrant or descendant living in the Levant.77 This makes her study of royal identity in the 
kingdom of Jerusalem around the time of the Second Crusade a potentially troublesome task. 
Gerish suggests, however, that a largely ignored text composed on the eve of the events of 
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1148 but covering the period 1099 to 1123 reflects the contemporary concerns of the young 
Baldwin III and his mother Melisende, the queen regnant. 
Scholars have suggested that the failure of the siege of Damascus helped propagate the 
Levantine  Muslim  jihad  or  so-called  ‘counter  crusade’.78 The  formation  and  effects  of 
contemporary jihad ideology is a topical field of study currently receiving due attention.79 
Suleiman Mourad and James  Lindsay contribute  to  the present  discussions  in  the current 
volume through analysis of the writings of Ibn Asākir.ʿ 80 They suggest that the Damascene 
scholar was motivated to disseminate jihad ideology during the rule (and at the behest) of his 
patron, sultan Nūr al-Dīn, as a result of the Christian attack on his home town in 1148.
Having achieved nothing of note in the region, Conrad III left the Levant in September 
1148 and Louis VII departed during the following April. Up until now, it was thought that this 
was  the  effective  end  of  the  activity  of  the  Second  Crusade  in  Outremer.  Janus  Møller 
Jensen’s contribution to the present volume suggests that a belated expedition to the Holy 
Land in 1151, led by the earl of Orkney, Rognval Kale Kolsson, and the Norwegian noble,  
Erling Ormsson Skakke, set sail in response to preaching in support of the Syrian campaign.  
As Jensen points out, however, there are no extant references of preaching for the campaign 
either  in  Scandinavia  (outside of  Denmark)  or  the Scandinavian  settlements  of  the North 
Atlantic.  Indeed,  there  exists  only  one  oblique  reference  to  a  (leading)  member  of  this 
expedition having assumed the cross.81 Nevertheless, it is clear that contemporary notions of 
Christian holy war infused with the ideals,  ambitions and obligations of the Scandinavian 
warrior  elite  in  the first  half  of  the  twelfth  century.  This  dovetailing  of  ideology,  Jensen 
contends, ensured that Jarl Rognval and Erling Skakke were willing recipients of the message 
of Eugenius III and Bernard of Clairvaux.
As we saw at the beginning of this introduction, the Second Crusade was also directed 
towards targets outside the Levant. At the Council of Frankfurt am Main held in March 1147, 
Bernard of Clairvaux seems to have verbally  sanctioned an extension in the geographical 
scope of the crusade. Saxon nobles declined Bernard’s invitation to campaign in the East, 
justifying their decision by referring to the idolatrous activities of the neighbouring pagan 
Wends. Bernard subsequently promised the Frankfurt am Main audience the same spiritual 
privileges for fighting the Wends as those offered to warriors who vowed to campaign in 
Outremer. Whether it was the Saxon nobles or Bernard of Clairvaux who first mooted the 
78 Aharon Ben-Ami,  Social Change in a Hostile Environment: The Crusaders’ Kingdom of Jerusalem 
(Princeton, N.J., 1969), p. 79; Meron Benvenisti, The Crusaders in the Holy Land (New York, 1970), pp. 6, 150; 
Yasser  Tabbaa,  ‘Monuments with a  Message:  Propagation of Jihad under Nur al-Din (1146–1174)’,  in  The 
Meeting of Two Worlds: Cultural Exchange between East and West during the Period of the Crusades ,  ed. 
Vladimir P. Goss (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1986), pp. 223–40 (here pp. 224–25);  Yaacov Lev, ‘The Jihad of Sultan 
Nur al-Din of Syria (1146–1174): History and Discourse’,  Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 35 (2008), 
227–84.
79 For example, Nikita Elisséeff, ‘The Reaction of the Syrian Muslims after the Foundation of the First 
Latin  Kingdom  of  Jerusalem’,  in  Crusaders  and  Muslims  in  Twelfth-Century  Syria,  ed.  Maya  Shatzmiller 
(Leiden,  1993),  pp. 162–72; Niall Christie,  ‘Motivating Listeners  in the  Kitab al-Jihad of Ali  ibn Tahir al-ʿ
Sulami (d. 1106)’, Crusades 6 (2007), 1–14; Niall Christie and Deborah Gerish, Preaching Holy War: Jihad and 
Crusade, 1095–1105 (Aldershot, 2009); Suleiman A. Mourad and James E. Lindsay,  The Intensification and 
Reorientation of Sunni Jihad Ideology in the Crusader Period: Ibn Asākir (1105ʿ –1176) of Damascus and His  
Age; with an Edition and Translation of Ibn Asākir’s ‘The Forty Hadiths for Inciting Jihad’ʿ  (Leiden, 2013).
80 Also  see  Suleiman  A.  Mourad  and  James  E.  Lindsay’s  ‘Rescuing  Syria  from  the  Infidels:  The  
Contribution of Ibn Asākir of Damascus to the ʿ Jihad Campaign of Sultan Nur al-Din’, Crusades 6 (2007), 37–
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81 Orkneyinga Saga:  The History  of  the  Earls  of  Orkney,  trans.  Hermann Pálsson and Paul  Edwards 
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extension of spiritual privileges to those wanting to fight the Wends is unclear, but one way or 
another, Bernard wholly supported the decisions made by the Saxon nobles, and a number of 
them then took the cross at Frankfurt am Main after vowing to campaign against their pagan 
neighbours.82 
Pope Eugenius III  reacted  quickly to  the  initiative  taken at  Frankfurt  am Main by 
issuing a third bull on 11 or 13 April.  Divina dispensatione  (II) effectively sanctioned the 
campaign to the southern Baltic region while mentioning the original expedition planned to 
liberate the Church in the Latin East and referring to the Christian-Muslim conflict  in the 
Iberian  Peninsula.83 Individuals  in  northern  Germany,  Denmark  and  Poland  promptly 
responded to Bernard’s and Eugenius’s calls to arms and were ready to embark against their 
pagan  neighbours  in  the  summer  of  1147.  The  motivation  for  embarking  on  the  Baltic 
campaigns and the corollary vocabulary employed by Bernard in his letters preaching the 
Wendish expedition have given rise to much debate. Bernard wrote that the Christians were 
armed to exterminate or convert the pagan peoples (nationes). He prohibited the Christians 
from making agreements with the Wends for money or tribute until either the pagan rite or the 
people (natio) were destroyed. Such a suggestion was of course counter to both canon law and 
Christian  theology.  According  to  Kahl,  Bernard  believed  the  Last  Days  were  imminent. 
Unusual things could therefore happen, perhaps including the forceful baptism of the pagan 
Wends or their extermination should they fail to convert.  Friedrich Lotter reads Bernard’s 
letters differently.  He suggests that when the abbot called for the destruction of Wendish 
natio(nes), he was referring to the pagan peoples’ tribal communities. The choice was not 
between conversion or death; conversion was inevitable. The choice was between conversion 
while  continuing to  exist  in  their  existing  tribal  units  and under  their  own chiefs,  or  the 
destruction of their political organisation and subjugation by foreign Christian rulers.84
In his contribution to the present volume, Jay T. Lees maintains that the ambiguous 
terminology employed by Bernard in his letters of exhortation reflects the abbot’s desire to 
attract  warriors  and  churchmen  with  multifaceted  concerns  for  an  ill-defined  venture. 
Tradition holds that people were motivated to embark on the Wendish campaign for several 
reasons.85 Eric Christiansen, for example,  suggests that the expedition provided the Danes 
with an opportunity to seek revenge against Slav pirates and slavers. For the Poles, it was 
simply a chance to intimidate the ‘Prussians’. The Saxons were only interested in the receipt 
of tribute: ‘They did not want to kill the goose that laid the eggs, even for the good of their 
souls’.86 It seems that the Danes, Saxons and Poles were united in their pursuit of their non-
82 Otto of Freising, Gesta Frederici, I.43 (pp. 210–13) and The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 76–78; 
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pious aims.  As Tyerman  states,  ‘politics  got  the better  of  piety’.87 Lees  concurs with the 
traditional  interpretation.  But  he  argues  that  many  of  the  various  lords  who campaigned 
against the Baltic Slavs were compelled to participate owing to their individual geopolitical 
concerns. Not all of the major contributors in the expedition were willing participants in some 
sort of shared endeavour.
In a contribution that assesses Polish involvement in the events of 1147–48 from a 
broad  chronological  perspective,  Darius  von  Güttner-Sporzyński  suggests  that  political 
expediency and pious concerns were not mutually exclusive. Both concepts underscored a 
desire to campaign around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea. He argues this was especially 
true of the Polish Piast dynasty that looked to promote and participate in holy war and the 
Wendish campaign  in  pursuit  of  political  and territorial  ambitions  and obligations.  While 
throwing valuable  light  on  an  otherwise  rather  inaccessible  corpus  of  Polish  scholarship, 
Güttner-Sporzyński maintains that a Polish contingent probably headed by the Piast Junior, 
Henry of Sandomierz, encountered the army led by Louis VII of France in Anatolia. He also 
suggests that an expedition against pagan Prussians undertaken in the last months of 1147 and 
led by the Piast suzerain of Poland, Bolesław IV the Curly, should be seen as a corollary of 
the Wendish campaign. 
Güttner-Sporzyński agrees with a strand of Polish historiography in maintaining that a 
papal legate, one Cardinal Hubaldus, preached in Poland. He was probably the same legate 
who may have preached for the eastern expedition in Denmark. The Danish archbishop, Eskil 
of Lund, a friend of Bernard of Clairvaux, is known to have encouraged the warring Danish 
kings, Knud V and Svend III, to participate in the Baltic campaign. Both kings subsequently 
took the cross.  The rapid response  to  Bernard’s  and Eugenius’s  extension  of  their  initial 
enterprise suggests that warriors and churchmen of northern Europe had already begun to put 
their affairs in order, and that a call to arms was widespread in Poland, Denmark and northern 
Germany before Eugenius issued his third bull.  We have noted that a number of German 
nobles vowed to campaign against their pagan enemy at the Council of Frankfurt am Main in 
March 1147. Sources such as the Würzburg annalist refer to many Christian knights assuming 
the cross, but very little evidence has come to light of individuals undergoing the actual rite 
for  taking the cross  before embarking  on the Wendish  campaign.88 Similarly,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  the  warriors  involved  on  the  Prussian  campaign  performing  the  rite  before 
marching against their  enemy.  Nonetheless,  Güttner-Sporzyński conjectures that the Piasts 
planned  the  latter  expedition  in  response  to  prior  Bernardine  inspired  preaching  and  the 
issuing of Divina dispensatione (II).
John  H.  Lind  proposes  that  the  call  to  arms  of  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  and  Pope 
Eugenius III  influenced  Christian-pagan  conflict  in  a  further  theatre  of  war.  In  another 
contribution  that  views  the  events  of  the  mid-twelfth  century  from a  wide  chronological 
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perspective, Lind suggests that a Swedish campaign known as the ‘First Swedish Crusade’, 
conducted against pagan Finns and traditionally dated to the late 1150s, may in fact have 
taken  place  around the  same  time  as  the  Wendish  campaign.  Swedish  bishops  remained 
suffragans of the Danish archbishopric at this point, and Cardinal Hubaldus seems to have 
preached  in  Denmark.  The  paucity  of  extant  medieval  records  in  Scandinavia,  however, 
virtually  guarantees  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  individuals  assuming  the  cross  before 
embarking  on  the  Swedish  enterprise.  As  Lind  points  out,  there  is  no  extant  papal  bull 
proclaiming the expedition against the Finns either. Nonetheless, even if the conventional yet 
problematic  dating  of  the  expedition  is  accepted,  Lind  maintains  that  Eugenius’s  and 
Bernard’s  call  to  arms  may  have  been  interpreted  in  Sweden  as  a  proclamation  of  a 
‘perpetual’  campaign against  all  the pagans in the region. Either  way,  he conjectures,  the 
‘First Swedish Crusade’ was conceived within the same Bernardine ideological framework as 
the Wendish campaign. 
The  expeditions  against  the  Wends  had  two  parts.  A  combined  Saxon  army  was 
headed by Duke Henry the Lion of Saxony and supported by the Danish fleets of the rival 
kings  Knud V  and  Svend III.  This  force  unsuccessfully  besieged  the  remote  and  newly 
fortified pagan Abrodite outpost at Dobin on Lake Schwerin in July 1147. Margrave Albert 
the Bear and the papal legate, Anselm of Havelberg, led a second force. The army may have 
included a Polish contingent headed by the Piast prince, Mieszko III the Old. The combined 
forces set out from Magdeburg in late July and advanced towards the territory of the pagan 
Liutizians.  After the capture of Havelberg,  the army pushed on to  unsuccessfully besiege 
Liutizian Demmin on the River Peene. A contingent led by Albert the Bear continued east to 
the gates of the western Pomeranian trading station of Szczecin. Here Albert discovered that 
the  town  was  already  in  Christian  hands,  which  effectively  put  an  end  to  the  Wendish 
campaign.
Whilst  evidence  of  individuals  taking  the  cross  and  publicly  vowing  to  campaign 
against the pagan Slavs is not extensive, the Wendish expeditions were legitimised by Pope 
Eugenius III and preached by the Church. The most widely held ‘pluralist’  definition of a 
crusade accepts that crusades were a form of service performed for Christ, preached by the 
Church, and proclaimed and sanctioned by the heirs of St Peter. As such, crusades could be 
directed against the enemies of the papacy wherever they might be found. Individuals were 
called to fight on behalf of Christendom, and, according to the pluralist definition, at least 
some of  the  participants  embarking  on an expedition  must  have publicly taken a  vow to 
campaign in a certain theatre. In return for their vow, the combatants assumed the Saviour’s 
cross in  imitatio Christi  and received valuable privileges of a temporal and spiritual nature 
predicated on the papacy’s magisterium and the Church’s role as spiritual mediator.89 Given 
this widely held definition, it would appear that the Wendish campaigns along with the Syrian 
expedition should be seen as crusades, and there would seem to be little reason to argue that 
the Wendish campaigns did not form part of the Second Crusade.
89 Giles  Constable  was  the  first  to  identify  four  different  definitions  of  a  crusade.  See  his  ‘The 
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Angeliki E. Laiou and Roy Parviz Mattahedeh (Washington, D.C., 2001), pp. 1–22 (here pp. 12–15). A revised 
and updated version can be found in Constable,  Crusaders and Crusading in the Twelfth Century (Aldershot, 
2008), pp. 3–43. For an excellent detailed analysis of the approaches to defining a crusade see Norman Housley,  
Contesting the Crusades (Malden, Mass., 2006), pp. 1–23. Tyerman argues that to define campaigns undertaken 
before the thirteenth century as crusades is anachronistic.  See Christopher J. Tyerman,  The Invention of the  
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The Prussian and Finnish campaigns, and indeed the expedition of Jarl Rognval and 
Erling  Skakke  in  1151,  do  not  adhere  to  the  so-called  pluralist  definition.  Nonetheless, 
Güttner-Sporzyński, Lind and Jensen maintain that these expeditions were indeed crusades. 
Their views highlight the problem in defining a crusade. Strict pluralism will not allow that 
the  Prussian  campaign  was  a  crusade  until,  for  example,  evidence  comes  to  light  of 
individuals taking the cross before embarking on the expedition.  Neither will the pluralist 
definition allow that the voyage of Jarl Rognval and Erling Skakke was a crusade until further 
evidence is found of, for instance, preaching taking place in Norway and the Scandinavian 
settlements  of  the  North  Atlantic  in  support  of  the  expedition.  Yet  analogous  evidence 
suggests  that  these  campaigns  did  take  place  in  the  context  of  the  Wendish  and  Syrian 
crusades. Similarly, there is no evidence that the campaign traditionally known as the ‘First 
Swedish Crusade’ was proclaimed or sanctioned by the papacy, preached by the Church, or 
that those who campaigned against the Finns had taken the cross. Yet the campaign has been 
considered a crusade for many years,  as have the Swedish campaigns undertaken in near 
perpetuity like the thirty- to forty-year ‘crusade’ against the pagan Karelians referred to in 
Lind’s contribution. These Swedish campaigns were not crusades according to the pluralist 
formula.90
A  similar  situation  arises  when  the  campaigns  in  Iberia  are  considered.  A 
heterogeneous fleet of north European warriors sailed out from the Dart estuary in May 1147 
with the intention of sailing to the Levant and fighting in the holy war. The fleet stopped en 
route  and  assisted  the  Portuguese  ruler,  Afonso  Henriques,  in  his  siege  of  Muslim-held 
Lisbon, which fell to the allied forces on 24 October. Harold Livermore argues that a letter of 
questionable authenticity purportedly written by Bernard of Clairvaux to Afonso is in fact 
genuine.  He  argues  that  the  letter  demonstrates  that  Afonso  had  requested  the  abbot’s 
assistance in recruiting forces to help him in Portugal.91 Drawing on Livermore’s argument, 
Phillips  agreed  that  the  northern  Europeans’  participation  in  the  siege  of  Lisbon  was 
premeditated.  He  also  pointed  out  that  Bernard  of  Clairvaux  spent  around  three  months 
preaching the holy enterprise in the Low Countries and had met Christian of Ghistelles, the 
leader  of  the  besiegers’  Flemish  contingent.92 Forey,  however,  forcefully  restates  that 
Bernard’s supposed letter is indeed a forgery. He also argues that other evidence relating to 
Bernard’s alleged support of an attack on Lisbon is unconvincing.93 Phillips has since nuanced 
his interpretation of this central point of contention.  He suggests that upon hearing of the 
crusading plans, Afonso probably made contact with the Church authorities and with northern 
Europeans with whom he was familiar. Afonso’s aim was to ensure that the fleet sailed to 
Lisbon with the  hope of  advancing Christianity  and securing the financial  rewards that  a 
successful siege might bring.94 The two most important sources for the siege of Lisbon,  De 
expugnatione  Lyxbonensi and  the  so-called  ‘Lisbon  Letter’,  both  demonstrate  that  the 
Portuguese ruler knew of the fleet’s existence before it reached Lisbon. However, this does 
not prove that the attack on Lisbon was premeditated. And as Forey points out, the former 
source indicates that the negotiations which resulted in the allied attack on Lisbon did not 
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commence until  the  fleet  had made landfall  in  Portugal.  He concludes  that  the  fleet  was 
essentially  persuaded  to  assist  Afonso  only  after  reaching  Lisbon  (presumably  to  collect 
provisions). The crusaders had not, therefore, initially intended to assist Afonso Henriques in 
his on-going siege.95 In her contribution to the present volume, Susan B. Edgington attempts 
to steer a path between the theories of Forey and Phillips. In agreement with Phillips, she 
maintains that Afonso knew of the existence of the fleet before any of its ships made landfall 
in Iberia. Edgington also hypothesises that Afonso knew when the main fleet was likely to 
make landfall  near Lisbon and made preparations  to receive it.  Like Forey,  however,  she 
concludes that the crusaders only agreed to assist Afonso after they had disembarked in Iberia, 
and it would therefore be very difficult to view the crusaders’ actions at Lisbon as forming 
part of a preconceived Cistercian plan to attack the enemies of Christendom on three broad 
fronts. Indeed, Forey maintains that the events at Lisbon should only be viewed as an episode 
in the ongoing Christian-Muslim conflict in Iberia.96 Stephen Lay adds that Afonso simply 
took the opportunity afforded by the arrival of the fleet to extend and consolidate his own 
demense.97 Tyerman submits that Afonso saw the arrival of the fleet  as an opportunity to 
exploit the political collapse of the previously dominant Almoravids in al-Andalus and the 
temporary disunity of the Taifas, the independent petty Muslim kingdoms created in the wake 
of the Almoravid collapse. The capitulation of Lisbon would reinforce Afonso’s credentials as 
a Christian king worthy of papal recognition. It would also further assert his independence 
from his nominal overlord, the emperor Alfonso VII of León-Castile.98 It seems that Afonso’s 
decision to besiege Lisbon was not encouraged by Eugenius’s and Bernard’s propagation of 
holy war. 
Luis  García-Guijarro  views  the  contemporaneous  Christian  attacks  on  Muslim 
Almería and Tortosa in a similar vein. The letter  Divina dispensatione (II), issued in April 
1147, referred to the Christian-Muslim conflict in the Iberian Peninsula; a year later, the pope 
appeared to make reference to privileges offered to those that had fought at Almería in 1147 
or perhaps Jaén in 1148; and Eugenius III also offered the remission of sins to those that 
fought  alongside  Count  Ramón  Berenguer IV  of  Barcelona.  Ramón  Berenguer  captured 
Tortosa  in  1148  and  the  inland  city  of  Lérida  and  the  outlying  castles  of  Fraga  and 
Mequinenza in the last months of 1149.99 These Muslim cities and strong points had long been 
the subject of native Christian attention and aggression; indeed, the origins of the campaigns 
that led to their conquest were conceived in Iberia. Whilst there is no unequivocal evidence of 
individuals  taking  the  cross  before  embarking  on any of  these  expeditions,  warriors  and 
churchmen alike employed the rhetoric of holy war in propagation of the operations and the 
campaigns were clearly endorsed by the Church authorities.100 García-Guijarro recognises that 
Christian aggression against Muslim peoples in the Iberian Peninsula had been imbued with 
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notions  of holy war since the ninth  century.  In taking a  broad chronological  perspective, 
however, he argues that the Christian-Muslim conflicts in Iberia, typified by the conquest of 
Tortosa on the Ebro in  December  1148 by the Genoese,  the warriors  who had fought at 
Lisbon and Ramón Berenguer IV of Barcelona,  as well as the latter’s successful attack on 
Lérida,  were not what  he calls  ‘proper crusades’.  He supposes that  Christian protagonists 
pursued a distinct native ideology of holy war, that of the Reconquista, in furtherance of their 
expansionist policies. This was at the very time when political relations within and between 
the Christian kingdoms and counties and the disintegration of Almoravid power in al-Andalus 
made  expansion  possible.  According  to  García-Guijarro,  the  ‘practice  of  crusading’  was 
merely one weapon in a ruler’s  arsenal,  and certainly not the principal  factor  influencing 
Christian expansion in Iberia. 
Strict  advocates  of  the  ‘pluralist’  approach  to  crusade  history  would  like  to  see 
evidence of all of the prescribed devotional and juridical formulae in Iberia (and indeed the 
Baltic region and the Scandinavian settlements of the North Atlantic) before accepting that all 
of  the  above  identified  campaigns  were  crusades.  It  would  follow  that  not  all  of  these 
campaigns can be considered as forming part of the Second Crusade in the absence of the 
constituent parts of the formulae. Nevertheless, Constable, Phillips, Simon Barton, Nicholas 
Jaspert and John Williams all argue that the campaigns against Almería, Lisbon, Tortosa and 
Jaen were crusades even given an absence of prescribed formula in the textual record. Indeed, 
historians  tend to  agree  that  the  campaigns  should  be  considered  as  forming  part  of  the 
Second  Crusade,  while  recognising  that  native  and  foreign  religious  zeal,  long-term 
geopolitical strategic goals and the hope of commercial and material gain dovetailed in the 
Iberian Peninsula.101 
The  warrior  and  commercial  elite  undoubtedly  had  various  temporal  reasons  for 
engaging in warfare in Iberia and indeed in the Baltic region. Warfare between Christians and 
Muslims and Christians and pagans predated the issuing of  Divina dispensatione (II) and it 
would continue long after 1149. When viewed from a broader chronological perspective, it 
becomes easy to see that the Christian offensives undertaken between 1147 and 1149 on the 
north-eastern  and  western  peripheries  of  Christendom  fit  into  an  established  pattern  of 
worldly aggression and expansion. Normal temporal aspirations were not suspended during 
these years. It is possible, even likely, that Christian aggression in Iberia and the Baltic area 
would have occurred without papal and clerical support. 
The same broad chronological perspective also reveals a long established concern with 
spiritually rewarding warfare, and religious concerns intertwined with temporal motives in the 
minds of contemporaries. God rewarded spiritually meritorious acts with earthly gains. Even 
though the conflicts took place on the periphery of Christendom, the wars were of a type that 
100 Constable, ‘The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries’, pp. 228–35, 257–60; Phillips,  Second 
Crusade,  pp. 136–67,  244–68;  Nicholas  Jaspert,  ‘Capta est  Dertosa,  clavis  Christianorum:  Tortosa  and the 
Crusades’,  in  Second  Crusade,  ed.  Phillips  and  Hoch,  pp. 90–110;  Simon  Barton,  ‘A  Forgotten  Crusade: 
Alfonso VII  of  León-Castile’s  Campaign  for  Jaen  (1148)’,  Historical  Research 73  (2000),  312–20;  Rudolf 
Hiestand, ‘Reconquista, Kreuzzug und Heiliges Grab: Die Eroberung von Tortosa 1148 im Lichtes eines neuen 
Zeugnisses’,  Gesammelte  Aufsätze zur Kulturgeschichte Spaniens 31 (1984),  136–57; John Bryan  Williams, 
‘The Making of a Crusade:  The Genoese  Anti-Muslim Attacks in Spain,  1146–1168’,  Journal of  Medieval  
History 23 (1997), 29–53.
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was deep rooted in Christendom’s central structures.102 Supported by the papacy, incorporated 
into the Church’s penitential system and powerfully associated with the ideals of Christian 
knighthood, the wars were fought within the ideological context of holy war. It would be 
problematic to consider the rhetoric of individuals who professed to engage in holy war as 
merely propaganda, or perhaps no more than window dressing arranged to conceal processes 
of  conquest,  subjugation  and extraction.  To do so would be to  deny a mass  of  evidence 
revealing that such activity was considered spiritually beneficial. This approach would also 
make  light  of  the  spiritual  anxiety  prevalent  in  the  medieval  mind  where  the  pains  of 
‘purgatory’,  the horrors of hell and the glory of heaven were no less real than the bloody 
sword in a warrior’s hand. 
Attempting  to  secure  and expand the  peripheries  of  Christendom and engaging  in 
penitential warfare was often the same thing. The tumultuous events in the Near East in 1144 
that gave rise to subsequent papal bulls and Bernardine inspired preaching coincided with, for 
instance,  advantageous  geopolitical  circumstances  in  the  Iberian  Peninsula  that  expedited 
Christian territorial expansion. And the ubiquitous medieval concern for the soul was no less 
important to contemporaries than the desire for material gain and the acquisition of land. It is 
impossible to prove, for example, that those Christians who campaigned annually against the 
pagan Wends and did so again in 1147 did not share similar spiritual anxieties with those 
warriors  who  vowed  to  march  to  Jerusalem.  There  is  a  danger  in  clinically  construing 
motivation from behaviour in such instances. The evidence does not allow a neat separation of 
religious from worldly matters. As noble warriors, those that fought in Iberia and the Baltic 
region had temporal ambitions and obligations. The warriors in each region had also been 
familiar with the notion of spiritually rewarding warfare since at least the second half of the 
eleventh century and these same warriors were instrumental  in  seeking papal  and clerical 
support  for  their  military  actions.  In  other  words,  they  endeavoured  to  secure  spiritual 
privileges  in  pursuit  of  long  held  political  and  commercial  ambitions.  The  initiatives 
undertaken were – to varying degrees – championed by Eugenius III, Bernard of Clairvaux 
and others who preached in support of the various campaigns. Consequently,  in Iberia the 
native rulers were able to engage their enemies with allied Christian support. Christian forces 
campaigning around the southern shore of the Baltic Sea were able to ally together to form 
substantial armies while securing indulgences for their subsequent actions. 
It is important to recognise that circumstances conspired between 1145 and 1149 to 
unite  with  a  fundamental  principle  which  the  Church authorities  actively  propagated:  the 
relationship between this world and the next was governed by cause and effect. This was 
Bernard’s ‘time of jubilee’ and surely in the mind of churchmen and warriors alike, these 
years  provided  the  opportunity  to  engage  in  reciprocal  behaviour.  The  circumstances 
dovetailed with the penitential  notion of  quid pro quo:  the Church taught that,  at least  in 
theory, penitential acts could suffice to wash away sin and warriors took up arms replete with 
this knowledge. This concept was both a central plank of the laity’s religious thinking and 
undeniably at the very heart of the crusading message. 
As  the  foregoing  discussion  has  demonstrated,  however,  there  is  little  consensus 
amongst  historians  of  what  is  meant  by  the  terms  ‘crusading’,  ‘crusade’  and  ‘crusader’. 
Certainly, the so-called pluralist ‘school of thought’ finds little favour in this volume where 
the terms are often employed without reference to (and in the absence of) any prescribed 
devotional and juridical formulae. This may suggest that the pluralist approach, with its focus 
on procedure  and ritual,  is  problematic  owing to one  very simple  reason:  the  lamentable 
dearth of extant documents in some regions. 
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One  thing  though  seems  to  connect  all  the  campaigns  which  contributors  to  the 
volume and the other historians  noted above see as an integral  constituent  of the Second 
Crusade:  Eugenius  III’s  promotion  of  holy  war.  Unsurprisingly,  chroniclers  and annalists 
were unaware of the extent of the pontiff’s support for the campaigns, but these were still 
righteous acts of violence that contemporaries viewed as directed against different targets and 
for which they could justly fight for both spiritual and temporal gain. Even though Eugenius 
endorsed existing initiatives, it does seem reasonable to suggest that a common link is evident 
connecting the Syrian, Iberian and Baltic campaigns within the same contextual enterprise if 
his espousal of holy war had some bearing on the Christian aggression in those three regions. 
No preconceived plan was needed for this to happen, and yet  the pontiff’s support of the 
various expeditions seems to bind them (or the crusade) together. Warriors marched against 
the  pagan  Wends  residing  around  the  southern  shore  of  the  Baltic  Sea  and  against  the 
Muslims living in the Levant and Iberia secure in the knowledge that they would receive the 
indulgence for doing so. Güttner-Sporzyński, Lind and Jensen would argue that those who 
took part in the campaigns against the Prussian and Finnish pagans and in the expedition to 
the Holy Land in 1151 likewise hoped to acquire God’s merit in return for their actions. If so, 
and if Eugenius and the curia did influence these campaigns, should they now be considered 
as forming part of the enterprise known as the Second Crusade?


